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Abstract 
Individual and household based aggregate measures of worklessness can, and do, offer conflicting signals 
about labour market performance. We outline a means of quantifying the extent of any disparity, 
(polarisation), in the signals stemming from individual and household-based measures of worklessness and 
apply this index to data from 5 countries over 25 years. Built around a comparison of the actual household 
workless rate with that which would occur if employment were randomly distributed over household 
occupants, we show that in all the countries we examine, there has been a growing disparity between the 
individual and household based workless measures. The polarisation count can be decomposed to identify 
which household groups are exposed to workless concentrations and can also be used to test which 
individual characteristics account for any excess worklessness among these household groups. We show 
that the incidence and magnitude of polarisation varies widely across countries, but that in all countries 
polarisation has increased. For each country most of the discrepancies between the individual and 
household workless counts stem from within-household factors, rather than from changing household 
composition. 
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   “The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there.” 
  
       L.P. Hartley, ‘The Go-Between,’ (1953) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The analysis and examination of most labour market data relies on information 
collected on individuals, which is then aggregated to cover a population of interest. 
Unemployment and non-employment rates are constructed in this way. Other social 
indicators however, such as poverty and inequality, are typically based on household level 
data. Gregg and Wadsworth (1996, 1998) first noted that workless signals based on 
individual compared to household levels of aggregation can be quite different and that the 
pattern of employment in certain OECD countries had become increasingly unevenly 
distributed across working age households. Since then, the UK government, (for example, 
Labour Market Trends 2003), the OECD, (OECD, 1998, 2002) and European Union, 
(European Commission, 2001, Eurostat, 2003) have all begun to include household based 
workless information among their key indicators of labour market performance and social 
exclusion.  
The household circumstances of workless individuals are clearly important.  
Households lacking any wage income will be more likely to be dependent on welfare 
payments and more likely to be poor. This in turn has implications for the scale of 
government welfare finance for a given level of employment. OECD (2001) shows that 
workless household rates are far more highly correlated with non-pensioner poverty across 
countries than individual based unemployment or employment rates. Dickens and Ellwood 
(2002) show that household-level employment patterns help explain how Britain combines 
unemployment at just over 5 per cent, currently the lowest in any G7 country, with high 
levels of poverty and inequality amongst the working age population, especially among 
families with children, a point echoed by Nickell (2003). Jimeno et al. (2000), see rising 
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numbers of multi-earner households as a principal cause underlying recent rising inequality in 
the distribution of labour income across Spanish households. 
Whilst the growth in the numbers of workless households in many countries is now 
undeniable, little is known about the extent of divergence between household and individual 
based workless measures and why this relationship may have changed over time. Over the 
last twenty years, the share of single adult households in many countries has risen and this 
will mean a greater likelihood of both fully employed and no work households at any given 
employment level, other things equal. This raises an important issue for policy-makers, since 
the solution to the growing problem of workless households will differ depending on the 
cause. If rising workless household rates stem largely from a move towards smaller 
households, then there is a need to understand the processes that underlie household 
formation and dissolution. Conversely, if there are trends toward a more unequal division of 
the work that exists within household types, then policy makers need to be aware of the 
reasons why jobs are going disproportionately to households already benefiting from earned 
income.  
To address these issues, we derive and apply a simple set of indices to 5 OECD 
countries with differing levels of employment, family structure and welfare support over a 
twenty-five year period. The indices quantify the extent of any discrepancy between 
individual and household measures of worklessness and, importantly, can be decomposed so 
as to identify both the main sources of any changes in these indices over time and the 
individual characteristics that may account for any excess worklessness among these 
household groups. Built around a comparison of the actual household workless rate with a 
counterfactual rate that would occur if work were randomly distributed over the working age 
population, we show that there is a growing “polarisation” of work across households in each 
country. This means that work is increasingly unevenly distributed at any given employment 
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rate. The increase in polarisation is most marked in the UK, Spain and Australia and lowest in 
the US and the western part of Germany. This increased polarisation does not appear to be 
driven by changes in household composition. We then examine how much polarisation can be 
accounted for by allowing the counterfactual predictions conditional on gender, age, 
education and regional characteristics of individuals and their interaction within households. 
Section 2 sets out the basic facts about individual and household based workless 
measures in the 5 OECD countries. Section 3 considers formally why such divergences can 
arise and defines a set of household based measures of worklessness and polarisation. Section 
4 decomposes the change over time into the various components which offer insights into the 
nature of the observed polarisation. Section 5 outlines differences in institutional frameworks 
across countries that may help shed light on the results. Section 6 sets out some conclusions 
and discusses the policy implications of these findings.  
2. Household Employment Patterns 
 We begin with a simple outline of the existing facts on household based measures of 
employment. Most national surveys designed to elicit information on individuals also contain 
household identifiers. This is true of the Spanish and UK Labour Force Surveys, (LFS), the 
USA Current Population Survey, (CPS), and the smaller Australian Survey of Income and 
Housing Costs (or earlier Income Distribution Surveys) (IDS)1 and German Socio-Economic 
Panel, (GSOEP). The data can only cover the former West Germany over the full time period 
and so all references to Germany here apply only to the Lander of the old West Germany. We 
count the number of adults employed and non-employed according to ILO/OECD definitions 
in each household for each year and for each country. A workless household, in our 
definition, is observed when all the adult occupants of working age are out of work. 
Similarly, an “all-work” household occurs when all adult occupants are in work. We confine 
our estimates to the population of working age2, exclude full-time students and all households 
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with a head above retirement age, to try and reduce the effects of any changes in educational 
participation and state legislated retirement on our results. Since we are interested primarily 
in the diverging signals emanating from the individual and household non-employment rates, 
we make no initial distinction between ILO unemployed and ILO inactive, though this is 
discussed in section 5 below. 
 Tables 1a-c and Figure 1 contrast the trends in non-employment based on household 
and individual units of aggregation from 1977 onward. To illustrate our central concern, note 
that the share of British and Spanish households where no adult works roughly doubles, to 
17% and 13 % respectively, between 1977 and 2000, (Table 1a), whilst the individual based 
non-employment rates in the year 2000 are at or below the levels observed in the mid-
seventies, (Table 1c). In Germany and Australia, the individual based non-employment rates 
fall during the eighties, but the household based rates rise. In the U.S.A., the 2000 workless 
household rate was similar to that observed in the late seventies, but the individual-based 
non-employment rate fell by six percentage points over the same period. It seems clear that 
household and individual based measures of worklessness emit very different signals about 
labour market performance.  
Table 1b also documents a contemporary rise in the proportion of households where 
every one is in work. Households containing a mixture of working and non-working adults, 
(the omitted group), are in secular decline in every country we study. In all countries the 
share of mixed-work households has fallen sharply, typically by between fifteen and twenty 
points. In all countries except the US, the share of households where everyone works has 
risen alongside the share of workless households, whereas in the US however, the decline in 
the share of mixed work households has been accompanied only by a rise in the share of all-
work households. Policy makers are likely to be non-neutral as to whether there are more 
workless or “all-work” households. Workless households are highly likely to be dependent on 
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welfare payments, to be living in poverty and have attendant social problems. In what follows 
we focus disproportionately on workless households for these reasons3.  
 Household structure differs markedly across countries, (Table 2). Workless rates also 
vary considerably by household size. The more adults present, the lower the risk of 
worklessness. The relative workless differentials between household types however, differ 
across countries. Single adult households in Britain, Australia and Spain are relatively much 
more likely to be out of work than similar households in Germany and the U.S. The share of 
single adult households in Spain is noticeably much lower than elsewhere and Spain has more 
3+ adult households than other countries. Single adult households are increasingly common 
in all countries, most of all in Britain and Germany. These patterns will be important for 
section 4 where we decompose the change in workless household rates over time. 
3. Defining Polarisation 
Given the above observations, we wish to measure the extent of divergence between 
the individual and household based workless rates and to decompose and assess the reasons 
for any discrepancy. Consider a simple world of 2 households each containing 2 adults and a 
non-employment rate in the population of 50%. The world in which one adult is out of work 
in each household is very different from the world in which both adults work in one 
household and no one works in the other. Yet the individual-based aggregate non-
employment rate in the population is the same, and so is unable to distinguish between the 
two outcomes.   
Gregg and Wadsworth (2003) propose the use of a counterfactual household 
benchmark, namely the workless household rate that would occur if jobs were randomly 
distributed in the population. Why use equally distributed employment probabilities as a 
benchmark? The notion of this as the line of pure equality has intuitive appeal, like the 
benchmark used in the Lorenz curve. The idea is also consistent with Atkinson’s (1970) 
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equally distributed equivalent income and so fits within a (concave) Social Welfare function 
framework on which to base a benchmark. It also has parallels with the information theoretic 
entropy benchmark used in the Theil indices of inequality. In our case, “maximum entropy” 
is obtained by everyone having the same employment probability. Gregg and Wadsworth 
(2003) provide more discussion of the issues and the statistical properties of the measures 
presented here. Under this counterfactual mean-preserving spread, the aggregate individual 
non-employment rate would remain as observed but every individual would have the same 
probability of being out of work, which is simply the aggregate non-employment rate in the 
population at time t,  
nt ⇔  E[ni /n, t] = nt ,  ∀ i   
Existing indices of inequality tend to ignore the link between individuals and households. In 
our case, given an individual counterfactual, it follows that the counterfactual workless rate, 
wh, for every household h with i adults at time t is then given by: E[wh / i , n, t] =  nti (1) 
Ignoring time subscripts, the aggregate counterfactual workless household rate is then the 
weighted average of these rates, where the weights are the shares of each household type, si, 
and type is, in this instance, defined by the number of resident adults – though type could 
refer to any readily identifiable household grouping in the population. 
 
^
w    = Σi sini           (2) 
We define polarisation as the difference between the actual and predicted workless household 
rates4; the extent to which there are more (or fewer) workless households than would be 
predicted by a random distribution of employment across individuals.  
 P(w, si, n)  =  
^
ww −  = Σi siwi -  Σi sini = Σi si(wi - ni)   (3) 
This gives a cardinal measure, in percentage points, of the diverging signals from household 
and individual-based workless statistics. If work is randomly distributed then the predicted 
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and actual workless household rates are identical and the polarisation rate will be zero. A 
positive value indicates that work is distributed either within or across household types such 
that there is an “excess” of workless households. The larger the value, the greater the extent 
of polarisation. A negative value indicates that work is distributed such that there are fewer 
workless households than merited by a random draw.  
We can also calculate a relative measure of polarisation using the ratio of the actual 
and predicted rates, 
^
/ ww . In this case, a value of one would indicate no polarisation, values 
above one give the proportionate excess deviation of the workless household rate above the 
norm, values below one give the proportionate deviation below the norm. We have no reason 
to favour the absolute or relative version, so in what follows we present estimates from both 
specifications. Normalising the polarisation measures to try and take account of variation in 
employment over the economic cycle, by dividing the absolute polarisation index by the non-
employment rate, n, in each year, gives (
^
ww − )/n. This measure is still centred around zero, 
but the normalisation now makes the measure scale invariant, which facilitates comparisons 
across times and across countries with different non-employment rates5. We compute 
standard errors for all these statistics using the bootstrap method6.  
Gregg and Wadsworth (2003) show that the individual and household non-
employment rates need not move at the same rate or in the same direction over time. The 
workless household rate will rise if jobs are disproportionately lost in single rather than 
multiple adult households. Also, if job creation is skewed toward households with workers 
already present, then whilst the individual non-employment rate will fall, there may be little 
impact on the workless household rate. So changes in the polarisation index depend on how 
unevenly work is distributed among multi-adult households and on whether single adult 
households are losing work relative to multi-adult households7.  
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Decomposition of Polarisation  
 In order to explore the source of any disturbance we need to decompose changes over 
time in both the actual workless household rate and the polarisation count. Using a shift-share 
breakdown, we decompose the change in polarisation between period 1 and 0 as8 
∆(w-
^
w ) = Σi ∆si(wi - ni)  
   = Σi ∆si*[0.5(wi - ni)0 + 0.5(wi - ni)1 ] + Σi ∆(wi - ni)*[0.5 si0 + 0.5 si1]    (4) 
where the first term is the between household type component, the second term measures the 
within household type component.  Any change in polarisation is therefore due to shifts in 
household structure towards family types who tend to have lower employment probabilities, 
(term 1), or to employment opportunities worsening amongst all family types, (term 2). Term 
2 can be decomposed further so as to identify the contribution of each household to the within 
household component. Since the actual rate equals the predicted plus residual polarisation a 
similar shift-share breakdown of the change in the workless household rate gives: 
∆w  = ∆
^
w  + ∆(w -
^
w ) = Σi ∆i si ni + Σi ∆i si(wi - ni)  
  = Σi ∆i si*[0.5 ni 0 + 0.5 ni 1 ] + Σi ∆i ni *[0.5 si0 + 0.5 si1]    
  + Σi ∆i si*[0.5(wi - ni)0 + 0.5(wi - ni)1 ] + Σi ∆i (wi - ni)*[0.5 si0 + 0.5 si1]   (5) 
The 1st term gives the contribution of the change in the predicted rate due to changing 
household shares, the 2nd the change in the predicted rate due to changing non-employment 
rates, the 3rd between group polarisation and the 4th term within group polarisation. 
Cross-country counterfactuals 
Given the above, we can also predict a country’s workless household/polarisation rate given 
another country’s a) household composition b) non-employment rate. This can be done by 
adapting the workless household identity used in (5), in one of four ways. For example,  
^
W jk1 = 
 Σi sij nik  + Σi sij(wij - nij)        (6) 
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gives the predicted workless household rate in country j, using country k non-employment 
and the values for every other component  of country j, (household shares and polarisation). 
The components taken from the alternative country can be varied singularly or cumulatively. 
Decomposition by Individual Characteristics 
It could be argued that household occupants may have common characteristics, such as lower 
levels of educational attainment, that could make them more likely to experience 
worklessness simultaneously and that this might help explain any observed polarisation. To 
address this issue, the counterfactual non-employment rate in equation (1) can be assigned 
instead by the mean non-employment rate of sub-groups disaggregated according to 
characteristics known to affect the probability of employment, E(ni /X) = nx , so that the 
counterfactual workless household rate now equals the product of the i individual 
probabilities for each household occupant, E[whX / i , n, X] =  Пi=1i nXi = wxi, . This clarifies 
whether polarisation occurs because either (a) multi-adult household occupants have common 
characteristics which affect the chances of working or (b) single adult households have 
relatively more of the characteristics associated with low employment probabilities.  
As the degree of disaggregation increases, then the predicted and actual rates will tend 
to converge. The extent of disaggregation is, of course, arbitrary so in what follows we 
choose the major factors over which employment is known to vary: gender, age, 
qualifications and region. This “conditional” polarisation measure now becomes:  
P(w, si, n, X)  = Σi siwi -  Σi siwxi = Σi si(wi – wxi)              (7) 
Any difference from the measure introduced in (3) is attributable to variation in employment 
between the sub-groups conditional on the observed X in (7). Any residual within-group 
polarisation would suggest that workless households occur because all members of certain 
households suffer reduced access to work relative to others with similar characteristics. The 
conditional non-employment probabilities can be estimated non-parametrically using cell- 
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based sample non-employment means or by parametric regression.  
4. Results 
 We first measure polarisation in the 5 countries based on equation (3).  In Table 3 we 
present results for the years 1977, 1984, 1990 and 2000, which cover the start and end of the 
data in each country. The bootstrapped standard errors suggest that changes in the (absolute) 
polarisation count of more than 0.2 percentage points are likely to be statistically significant 
in Britain, Spain and the U.S., whilst changes in the order of a half to one point are significant 
in the, smaller, Australian and German data. Figure 3 plots the estimates over the entire 
sample period. All countries, except Australia, exhibit negative polarisation at the start of the 
respective periods, although this is more marked in Spain than elsewhere. Negative 
polarisation of work is consistent with theories of the gender division of non-work and work 
time (see for example Danziger and Katz, 1996, Francois, 1998). Added worker theory 
suggests that the presence (absence) of an employed adult in a household would reduce 
(raise) the labour supply of other occupants, (see Cullen and Gruber 2000). This means 
higher employment among single adult households but also fewer fully employed 
households, other things equal, and again is consistent with a negative polarisation count.  
Polarisation in Spain remains negative throughout the period, though the count 
increases significantly toward zero. However, in other countries the polarisation count 
becomes positive over time. Whilst all countries show increased polarisation against all the 
benchmarks shown, the largest rises in any of the absolute, standardised and relative 
measures occur in Britain, Spain and Australia. As a result, polarisation levels in 2000 are 
highest in the UK and Australia at 6.1 and 4.8 points respectively. On the relative measure 
these values equate to workless household rates in 2000 that were, respectively, 55% and 
44% higher than the counterfactual prediction. All the measures confirm that the bulk of the 
change in polarisation had occurred by the late eighties, except in Germay where the rise has 
 12 
 
 
been more recent. The US experienced a fall in polarisation in the late 1990s. 
Figure 3 also tracks the measure of polarisation over time alongside the workless 
household rate. There is little evidence of any cyclicality in the estimates of polarisation over 
time, except in Britain.  In Spain, polarisation rises during the 1990’s despite a recovery in 
the workless household rate. The use of the absolute, normalised or relative polarisation 
measures makes little difference to the trends over time, but may have some impact on the 
turning points in the data, (see Figure A1). All subsequent results use the absolute measure, 
but the estimates are similar using the other measures9. 
Explaining Polarisation 
    Improvements in aggregate employment rates, observed to a greater or lesser extent in 
all countries between beginning and end sample points, should have led to less workless 
households, whilst the shifts in household structure toward more single adult households 
should have produced more workless households, other things equal. Table 4 decomposes the 
change in workless household rates over the sample period into that due to changes in 
household structure, the aggregate employment rate and the contribution of within and 
between household group polarisation using (5). Column 2 gives the actual percentage point 
increase in the workless household rate; column 3 is the predicted increase due to the 
combined effect of changes in employment rates and shifts in household composition, (these 
effects are then separated); column 6 reports the percentage point increase in polarisation, 
which is then decomposed between and within household types. The within-household 
component is then split into the contribution due to each household type.   
Table 4 shows that the impact of changes in household structure over time is similar 
across countries, (column 4). The U.S. has the smallest predicted rise in workless households 
due to changes in household composition at 1.8 percentage points and Germany the highest at 
3.3 points. However in each country, the polarisation measure is substantially larger than the 
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predicted component and specifically more polarisation within household types, (column 7), 
rather than from shifts toward household types who already suffer high polarisation, (the 
between household component of polarisation in column 6).  
Except for Germany, changing household shares make a smaller contribution than 
(within group) polarisation, to the generalised growth in workless households for given 
employment levels. This suggests, to us, that explanations for these changes lie instead in the 
workings of the labour market and its interactions with given household structures.10 Britain 
is different from the other countries in that polarisation there has risen most within single 
adult households. Only 30% of all polarisation in Britain is within 2 adult households, 
(columns 8 to 10). In all other countries, 2 adult households account for two thirds or more of 
the polarisation. Interestingly, the single adult share in Britain rises most after 1990, when 
polarisation for this group starts to fall. In the 1990's, polarisation becomes more of a 
problem amongst multiple adult households in Britain. Among two adult households, within 
group polarisation is highest for Spain at 3.7 points and then at similar levels across other 
countries. Although Australia’s high polarisation rate is largely attributed to within 2 adult 
households, the “excess” of joblessness among single adult households is a shared attribute 
with Britain, which is absent in the other countries. 
Using other country household shares and non-employment rates, Table 5 gives 
counterfactual workless household rates, based on (6), for Britain, the country with the worst 
workless household rate and polarisation. The contributions of the donor country components 
are entered cumulatively in the table. We compare Britain with the US, as this is the country 
with the lowest workless household rate, and Spain since it differs most in household 
structure and employment levels. It is perhaps not surprising that when Spanish household 
shares are used, with correspondingly fewer single adult households, the predicted workless 
household rates for Britain are much smaller than the actual outturn. Higher Spanish non-
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employment rates then more than offset this effect, (column 2). Perhaps less obviously, when 
US household shares or employment levels are used, the predicted rates are little changed. 
However, Spanish or US within group polarisation levels would substantially reduce the 
workless household rate in Britain, (column 4). If Britain had all US characteristics other than 
within household type polarisation, this would only move the UK 1.8 points toward removing 
the 6.3 point difference in workless households.  
Conditional Polarisation  
 We next relax the assumption of a random distribution of work and predict household 
employment probabilities according to the characteristics of the individuals that comprise 
them using (7). Given the gender composition of the household, for example, we can assign 
the gender-specific non-employment rate to each member of the household and take the 
product to obtain a revised household workless probability. This allows us to assess how 
much the characteristics known to be associated with differential individual employment 
probabilities - gender, region, age and education – can account for polarisation of work across 
households. To facilitate cross-country comparisons we use 3 age groups, (16-24, 25-49, 
50+), 3 education groups, (degree, intermediate and low qualifications) and divide each 
country into 10 regions11. Sample sizes limit the extent of non-parametric disaggregation. We 
use one characteristic at a time and then interact. This non-parametric estimate can be used as 
a benchmark for any parametric prediction using the same or additional variables, entered in 
a more disaggregated form.12  
Table 6, (column 3), shows that allowing for changes in employment by gender does 
go some way toward explaining the change in polarisation in all countries, as this shifts the 
predicted rate closer to the actual household rate. This is particularly marked in Spain, where 
nearly all polarisation can be accounted for by changing patterns of employment across 
gender. In a world where nearly all men and few women work, conditioning on gender will 
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predict few workless households. Converging employment patterns by gender changes the 
predicted distribution of work, generating more households where both individuals work and 
others where no-one works. This strongly suggests a declining gender specific division of 
labour, at least as far as participation in the workforce, hours may still differ substantially.  
Columns IV and V consider regional and age/education variation in non-employment 
in turn. Regional variations make little difference to the predicted workless household rates in 
any country13.  The interaction of all four factors, (column VI) has some effect on the 
predicted workless rates in each country. Indeed this disaggregation explains all of the rise in 
polarisation in Germany. In Spain too, the bulk (75%) of the change in polarisation can be 
explained by these broad shifts in employment within the population. This is consistent with 
the notion that older, less educated men are losing work and prime-aged, better educated 
women are entering work. These groups live in different households and hence polarisation 
rises. Note though that, as noted by Juhn and Murphy (1997) for the US, this means that there 
is not an added worker effect whereby women are entering the labour market to compensate 
for their partners reduced employment. We note in passing that it seems unlikely that any 
increase in “assortative mating” along education lines can underlie much of the change in 
polarisation over this period14.  It is also important to realise that using this method, there is 
still a notable degree of residual polarisation in Britain, Australia and in the U.S.A. For 
example, we can explain only around a third of the large rise in polarisation in Britain 
between 1977 and 200015.  
Polarisation Within Household Types 
 Table 7 outlines changes in unconditional and conditional polarisation within each 
broad household type and gives the total within household type contribution. This enables us 
to see for which household types conditioning by characteristics reduces measured 
polarisation and where any remaining unexplained polarisation is concentrated. Over time, 
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unconditional polarisation has risen for single households in Britain and Australia but is static 
elsewhere. Conditioning on characteristics reduces the estimated polarisation counts but the 
basic relative patterns still hold, except in Spain where single adult households now have 
higher workless concentrations, conditional on characteristics. This appears to be because all 
the growth in female employment in Spain has been among two or multi-adult households. 
Shifts in the concentration of employment across age, gender, education and region explain 
much of the polarisation observed within two adult households. The remaining amount of 
conditional polarisation is then similar across countries. In sum then, single adult households 
have lost employment relative to similar people in multi-adult households in Australia, 
Britain and Spain and all countries have experienced some polarisation within couples. 
Presence of Children 
 Any worklessness in households with children has implications for child poverty and 
child development16. In Britain, the number of children living in workless households is one 
of many measures of child deprivation published regularly by the Department of Work and 
Pension (DWP, 2003). Since the polarisation indices can be applied to any household 
disaggregation, in Table 8 we calculate workless household rates and polarisation conditional 
on the presence of children.  
The country with by far the highest proportion of children living in workless 
households is Britain. Since 198417, the share of single parent families has grown across all 
countries, most of all in Britain and Australia. However, there are larger increases in the 
shares of single adult households without children in every country. Workless household 
rates are typically higher amongst single parent households, though Spain is an exception. 
Only in Britain and Australia is polarisation of employment amongst single parents 
substantially larger than for other household types. Over time, workless rates among single 
parents have fallen in all countries by considerable amounts, so polarisation has fallen too. 
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Polarisation and worklessness among single parent households in Britain and Australia 
remains high even when using the conditional benchmark. In the US, the dramatic fall in the 
workless household rate for single parent households has occurred mainly since the abolition 
of AFDC in 1996 (Ellwood, 2000, discusses this in detail). Britain and Australia are the only 
countries with positive polarisation amongst couples with children.  In Spain and Germany, 
couples with children are less likely to be workless even after conditioning on characteristics 
of both parents and in the US polarisation for this group is close to zero. So Britain and 
Australia have far more families with children where no adult works than the other countries 
and this occurs both in lone parents and couples when compared with the continental 
European countries. There is also polarisation among single adult households without 
children in Britain and Australia, which is not observed in other countries. The trends and 
estimates for couples without children are less diverse across countries.  
5. Relationship with Welfare Systems 
The polarisation counts identify which household groups are exposed to workless 
concentrations and which individual characteristics help explain excess worklessness. The 
main features of polarisation appear to be a general rise in polarisation among couples and a 
higher degree of polarisation in Britain and Australia compared to other countries. The 
general rise in polarisation among couples largely reflects the equalisation in employment 
across gender allied to the fact that (prime age, better educated) women entering the labour 
market are not in households with workless (older, less educated) men. The unusually high 
degree of worklessness in Britain and Australia given their (high) levels of employment is 
focused on families with children and single adults without children. Policy responses to 
these observations may also depend on the self-defined status of the individuals who 
comprise a workless household. Table 9 suggests that the composition of workless 
households manifests itself in different forms across countries. Most workless households are 
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now economically inactive and the inactive share has risen over time along with the workless 
household stock. This was not so in the 1980s, when the modal group were the unemployed 
everywhere but in Germany and Australia. Only around one third of workless households in 
Germany and Spain now contain at least one unemployed occupant and only a fifth of 
households in Britain and the U.S. Around 40% of workless households in Germany and 
Spain are over the age of 55 and economically inactive. This is the modal group in both 
countries. According to estimates not shown here, most individuals in these households 
consider themselves retired, despite being below official retirement age. In contrast, less than 
10% of British adults in workless households consider themselves as retired. More than twice 
as many individuals in the US and Britain classify themselves as sick, who make up much of 
the large “other” category, though we cannot define sickness consistently across countries.  
The share of lone parents among workless households is much higher in Britain than 
elsewhere. 
Table A3 in the appendix outlines the main characteristics of the wage distribution 
and welfare systems across the countries. A number of features fit the patterns of polarisation 
observed above, though our measures make no causal inference. The most generous 
component of Germany’s unemployment system lasts much longer for older workers, allied 
to the provision of an early retirement package for the over 60s. This is consistent with the 
high share of German older workers in Table 9 and the importance of age in explaining 
conditional polarisation in Table 6. Welfare requirements mean that lone parents in Spain, 
and more recently the US, are generally not exempt from job search. Lone parents have 
negative polarisation and contribute less to the workless household rate in these countries.  
Of more concern is Britain and Australia, which combine employment rates close to 
the US level with workless household rates higher than in mainland European, particularly 
among families with children. Britain and Australia share three features in their welfare 
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systems that might lie behind this. First, whilst welfare payments are not generous, they 
provide weak incentives to take jobs at the lower end of the wage distribution, a problem 
exacerbated by a level of wage inequality close to that of the US, which generates low wage 
offers in many jobs. Second, a minimal insurance-based safety net, relying much more on flat 
rate based means-tested social assistance packages. All child support is paid under means 
tested social assistance. Hence workless individuals therefore face radically different work 
incentives dependent on the presence of children and whether their partner has a job. In Spain 
and Germany, the longer duration and greater generosity of the insurance element creates a 
different incentive structure, as benefits are rarely means tested against partner’s income. 
Third, there are no earnings related benefit payments but benefits do vary according to family 
type. This again creates variation in incentives across family types, such that the presence of 
children in a workless household reduces the incentive to take a low wage job substantially. 
In mainland Europe, the long period of earnings-related benefit payments, (unlimited in 
Germany), means that work incentives vary only according to differences between previous 
earnings, and potential wage offers are unlikely to vary across family circumstances.  
Governments are becoming aware of these issues and there is evidence that policy is 
starting to be shaped accordingly. Early retirement packages are being phased out in 
Germany. In Britain the government has introduced a range of welfare reforms to reduce 
welfare dependency, especially among families with children since 1997 (see Walker and 
Wiseman, (2001), for a discussion of these reforms). In Australia, the ongoing welfare reform 
process has addressed many issues raised here, to varying degrees of success. The Jobs, 
Education, Training (JET) programme, introduced in 1989 to assist lone parents into re-
entering the labour force, is thought to have significantly raised levels of training, 
employment and earnings among the population of lone parents on income support (Social 
Justice Commission, 1994). Welfare payments for partners of the unemployed were partially 
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individualised in 1994 with the Working Nation reforms. More recently, financial incentives 
for families with children, especially with child-care costs and a wider focus on motivating 
and helping all welfare recipients to find work are likely to reduce joblessness amongst 
families with children. And indeed polarisation levels for families with children have 
declined between the mid 90s and 2000/01. It is too soon to determine whether this is a direct 
effect of the various policy changes or due to other macroeconomic factors.  
6. Conclusions 
 In Britain, Australia, the US, Spain and Germany, individual workless rates have 
fallen over the past twenty years but household-based workless rates have not. A simple 
focus on individual-based workless statistics can, and does, therefore obscure major labour 
market developments that can have important welfare, budgetary and efficiency 
consequences. The simple set of indices used in this paper can be used to assess the size of 
the disparity between individual and household-based measures of access to work and to 
isolate the source of any difference.  
We find that shifts in household composition toward more single adult households 
contribute little to the growing numbers of workless households. However, there have been 
dramatic changes in the distribution of work across households in Britain, Australia and 
Spain over the last 25 years and more modest changes in the US and Germany. This 
polarisation occurs within all household types. Polarisation can be accounted for partially by 
changing concentrations of employment across readily identifiable socio-economic groups. 
Indeed this approach can account for most of the rise in workless households in Germany. 
Strong employment performance in the US should be producing fewer workless households 
than we observe. A common rise in polarisation of work among couples is mainly because 
net new jobs seem to be going to women living in households with an existing earner rather 
than reducing the numbers of workless households, especially in Spain. Non-employment in 
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Britain and Australia is more concentrated on single adults and families with children, than in 
other countries. The greatest discrepancy between individual and household based measures 
of worklessness is in Britain.  
Many of these features would not have been revealed by a focus solely on individual 
based workless measures as indicators of labour market performance. Household based 
measures of worklessness can give important additional insights into the workings of the 
labour market. The indices used in this paper are able to link the two levels of aggregation. 
The issues and methods raised in this paper suggest how complementary analysis could 
proceed. 
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Footnotes 
                                                          
1
 The Australian data used are the 1982, 1986 and 1990 Income Distribution Surveys and the Income and 
Housing Costs Surveys from 1994/95 to 2000/01. The survey was not run in 1998/99 and the unit record data 
for 1999/2000 has not yet been released. 
 
2
  The retirement age in Spain, Germany and the United States is 65 for men and women.  In Britain men retire 
at 65 and women at 60. Australia has no formal retirement age but the retirement pension over most of this 
period was available for men at 65 and women at 60. 
 
3
  See Gregg and Wadsworth (2002) and Gregg, Dawkins and Scutella (2002a) for more discussion of the link 
with all-work household rates in the UK and Australia respectively. 
  
4
  Note that this is not the same polarisation as envisaged by Esteban and Ray (1994) who define it as a shift in 
the distribution from the centre to the two lateral masses. Our measure differs from those favoured by these 
authors since we focus on a discrete outcome (work) are not concerned with the absolute value of the variable 
under consideration ( in their case income). 
 
5
  In a 2 person to each household world, the three measures can be thought of as capturing the following: 
 
Polar1 = Pr(Non1 = 1 & Non2 = 1) - Pr (Non1 = 1)*Pr(Non2 = 1) 
Polar2 = Pr(Non1 = 1 & Non2 = 1) / Pr (Non1 = 1)*Pr(Non2 = 1) 
Polar3 = Pr(Non2 = 1 / Non1 = 1) - Pr(Non2 = 1) = Polar1/ Pr (Non1 = 1) 
 
6
  We use 200 replications to generate the standard errors in the tables. 
 
7
  For example, net job loss amongst single adult households and net job creation amongst multiple adult 
households against a background of net employment growth in the economy could be sufficient to generate a 
differential effect direction of the change in the workless household and non-employment rates. 
 
8
  We use the absolute polarisation index, but the decomposition also goes through on the relative measure.  
 
9
  Available from the authors on request. 
 
10
  Table A1 shows the cyclical variation in the within and between household group decomposition.  
 
11
 Australia is actually split into 12 regions: the 5 mainland States are separated by capital city/rest of state with 
Tasmania a single category and the Territories (ACT and NT) combined into 1 category 
 
12
  A logit/probit regression using the interaction of all the variables will, of course, give the same prediction as 
unconditional interactions.  
 
13
  This does not rule out the possibility that a finer area disaggregation may have a role to play. 
 
14
  We leave the issue of the role of assortative mating to future work, but note that for this explanation to work 
changes in characteristics must dominate changes in coefficients in the predicted probabilities over time. Using 
a parametric version of the predicted workless probability we find that in all of our five countries changes in 
coefficients dominate the decomposition of the change in predicted workless probabilities for 2 adult 
households.  
 
15
  Using a parametric specification that adds 9 age and 18-20 regional shift dummies to the full set of 
interaction terms, we can explain another one point (20%) of the change in British polarisation, but little more of 
the changes in other countries. 
 
16
   See Clark-Kauffman et al., 2003, for a summary of US experimental evidence on the impact of work and 
income on child development. 
 
17
  The British data only record the presence of children from 1983 onward. 
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Figure 1. Individual & Household Non-Employment Rates in Britain, the U.S. , Australia,  Germany and Spain 
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Figure 2. Polarisation Indices in Australia, Britain, Spain, Germany and the U.S.  
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Figure 3. Workless Rates and Polarisation Among Single Adult Households 
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b) single adult – without children 
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Table 1a. Workless Households Rates in Australia, Britain, Spain, the US, Germany  
 G.B. USA Spain Germany Australia 
1977   8.3 11.6  7.1 -- -- 
1984 
 
15.1 
(0.2) 
11.6 
(0.2) 
14.6 
(0.2) 
14.5 
(0.4) 
12.7 
(0.3) 
1990 14.1 12.0 13.0 12.6 13.8  
2000 16.9 10.7 12.6 16.3 15.9  
 
Table 1b. All Work Households in Australia, Britain, Spain, the US, Germany 
 GB USA Spain Germany Australia 
1977 57.6 49.2 21.0 -- -- 
1984 52.2 59.9 20.9 49.8 49.5  
1990 60.9 61.9 26.1 58.7 59.3 
2000 65.5 66.0 38.9 62.4 61.7 
 
Table 1c. Non-Employment Rates in Australia, Britain, Spain, the US, Germany 
 GB USA Spain Germany Australia 
1977 24.0 27.9 39.6 -- -- 
1984 29.1 24.9 47.2 31.4 29.8  
1990 23.2 24.0 42.7 27.5 25.4 
2000 23.0 21.6 36.3 27.3 25.2 
Source: LFS, SLFS, GSOEP, CPS. Notes. Data are all weighted. Population of working age in each country. 
Start date for Australia refers to 1982 rather than 1984 due to data limitations Australian data for 1994 onwards 
is collected over the financial year, thus for 1994/5, 1995/6, 1996/7, 1997/8 and 2000/1. Standard errors of 
household proportions in brackets for 1984, other years are similar apart from  Australia with a standard error of 
around 0.5 in 2000 due to a smaller sample in the survey data from 1994/95 onwards. 
 31
Table 2. Household Type Shares and Workless Rates in Australia, Britain, Spain, the US and Germany 
 1 Adult Households 2 Adult Households 3 Adult Households 
 G.B. Sp. De. USA Aus. G.B. Sp. De. USA Aus. G.B. Sp. De. USA Aus. 
Household Share 
1977 20.8 7.0 -- 24.2 -- 62.2 58.1 -- 62.4 -- 17.0 34.8 -- 13.4 -- 
1984 
 
21.1 
(0.2) 
8.4 
(0.1)  
30.1 
(0.6) 
27.4 
(0.2) 
19.2 
(0.4) 
60.0 
(0.3) 
58.0 
(0.2) 
52.0 
(0.7) 
59.2 
(0.2) 
62.1 
(0.5) 
19.2 
(0.2) 
33.6 
(0.2) 
18.0 
(0.6) 
13.3 
(0.2) 
18.6 
(0.4) 
1990 25.1 9.5  37.7 28.8 23.3 58.1 59.6 49.2 60.0 61.2 16.8 30.4 13.0 11.2 15.5 
2000 36.8 15.5 44.4 30.7 29.5  
(0.7) 
53.7 58.0 46.7 59.0 56.9  
(0.7) 
 9.5 26.5  8.9 10.4 13.7  
(0.4) 
Workless Household Rate 
1977 26.9 40.4 -- 25.9 -- 4.2 7.7 -- 6.7 -- 1.2 3.1 -- 2.6 -- 
1984 
 
42.0 
(0.6) 
45.9 
(0.9) 
23.4 
(1.4) 
26.0 
(0.4) 
35.2 
(1.0) 
10.4 
(0.2) 
13.4 
(0.2) 
9.8 
(0.5) 
7.2 
(0.2) 
8.4 
(0.3) 
3.6 
(0.2) 
9.0 
(0.3) 
1.0 
(0.4) 
3.2 
(0.3) 
3.7 
(0.4) 
1990 37.7 43.3 21.2 25.4 35.3 7.0 11.6 8.5 7.1 8.3 2.7 6.3 1.3 4.1 3.4 
2000 36.1 32.5 27.1 22.0 35.1 
(1.2) 
7.7 10.0 11.4 6.0 9.0 
(0.5) 
3.4 4.6 3.1 3.5 2.6 
(0.7) 
Source: LFS, SLFS, GSOEP, CPS . Standard errors of proportions in brackets 
 
 32
Table 3. Polarisation by country, 1977-2000 
 Workless 
Household 
(1) 
Counterfactual 
Prediction  
(2) 
Polarisation 
(1)-(2) 
Standardised 
Polarisation 
Relative 
Polarisation 
(1)/(2) 
Britain      
1977 8.3  (0.06)  8.5  (0.07) -0.2 (0.07) -1.4  (0.27) 0.98 (0.01) 
1984 16.9 (0.10) 11.7  (0.10)  5.3  (0.10) 19.8  (0.42) 1.49  (0.02) 
1990 14.3 (0.09)  9.3  (0.10)  5.0  (0.10) 21.7  (0.50) 1.56  (0.02) 
2000 16.9 (0.10) 10.8 (0.11)  6.1  (0.10) 25.9 (0.51) 1.55 (0.02) 
Change 1977-2000  8.6  2.3  6.3 27.3  .66 
Spain      
1977  7.0 (0.08) 13.8 (0.10) -6.8  (0.12) -17.5 (0.3) .50 (.005) 
1984 15.8 (0.08) 22.0 (0.13) -6.2 (0.13) -12.7 (0.2)  .72 (.005) 
1990 13.5 (0.07) 17.4 (0.10) -3.9 (0.12)  -9.2  (0.3) .77 (.006) 
2000 12.3 (0.10) 14.4 (0.11) -2.1 (0.12)  -5.7 (0.3) .86 (.008) 
Change 1977-2000   5.3  0.6  4.7 11.8 .36 
U.S.A.      
1977 11.7 (0.1) 12.8 (0.1) -1.1 (0.1) -3.8 (0.3) .91 (.01) 
1984 13.4 (0.1) 12.8 (0.1)  0.6 (0.1)  2.4 (0.3) 1.05 (.01) 
1990 12.0 (0.1) 10.9 (0.1)  1.1 (0.1)  4.5 (0.5) 1.10 (.02) 
2000 10.7 (0.1)  9.7 (0.1)  1.0 (0.1)  4.1 (0.5) 1.09 (.02) 
Change 1977-2000 -1.0 -3.1  2.1  7.9  .18 
Germany      
1984 14.5 (0.5) 15.5 (0.4) -1.0 (0.5) -3.2 (1.5) .93 (.03) 
1990 11.6 (0.5) 13.7 (0.4) -2.1 (0.5) -8.0 (1.9) .85 (.05) 
2000 16.3 (0.4) 15.9 (0.3)  0.4 (0.4)  1.7 (1.6) 1.03 (.03) 
Change 1984-2000  1.8  0.7  1.5  4.9  .10 
Australia      
1982 12.7 (0.2) 11.5 (0.2) 1.2 (0.2) 4.2 (0.72) 1.11 (0.03) 
1990 13.7 (0.2) 9.9 (0.2) 3.9 (0.2) 15.3 (0.7) 1.39 (0.03) 
2000 15.6 (0.3) 10.8 (0.3) 4.8 (0.3) 19.3 (1.3) 1.44 (0.05) 
Change 1982-2000 2.9 -0.6 3.6 15.1 0.33 
Note:  Standard errors in brackets are bootstrapped with 200 replications. 
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Table 4. Decomposition of Change in Workless Household Rate  
 Actual 
Change 
  Predicted Change (unconditional)        Polarisation 
Country  Total due to  
∆ non-
employment 
due to  
∆ household 
shares 
Total Between 
household 
 Within household 
   
  
 Total Total 1 Adult 2 Adult 3 Adult 
Britain: 1977-2000 8.6 2.3 -0.3 2.6 6.3 0.8 
(13%) 
5.5 
(87%) 
3.3 
(52%) 
1.9 
(30%) 
0.3 
(5%) 
Spain:1977-2000 5.1 0.5 -2.2 
 
2.7 
 
4.6 0.1 
(2%) 
4.5 
(98%) 
-0.5 
(-11%) 
3.7 
(80%) 
1.3 
(28%) 
U.S.A.:1977-2000 -1.0 -3.0 -4.8 
 
1.8 
 
2.0 -0.1 
(-5%) 
2.1 
(105%) 
-0.1 
(-5%) 
1.8 
(90%) 
0.3 
(15%) 
Ger.:1984-2000 1.9 0.4 -2.9 3.3 1.5 -0.3 
(-14%) 
1.8 
(114%) 
-0.2 
(-13%) 
1.6 
(106%) 
0.3 
(20%) 
Aus: 1982-2000 2.9 -0.6 -2.8 2.2 3.5 0.6 
(18%) 
2.9 
(82%) 
1.1 
(38%) 
1.9 
(64%) 
-0.1 
(-2%) 
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Table 5. Cross-Country Counterfactual Workless Household Predictions 
  Cumulative Effect Of Other Country Components  
 Own 
country 
rates 
h’hold shares 
on predicted 
Σi sik nij 
 
(1) 
Non-
employment 
on predicted 
Σi sik nik 
(2) 
h’hold 
shares on 
polarisation 
Σisik(wi-nij) 
(3) 
Other country 
polarisation 
Σisik(wik - nik) 
 
(4) 
Other 
country rate 
Great 
Britain 
 Using Spanish data  
1977 
 
8.2   5.1 13.8 13.6  6.8  6.8 
1984 
 
15.1 11.5 25.2 24.0 15.7 15.7 
1994 
 
19.1 14.3 27.4 25.4 17.9 17.9 
2000 
 
16.9 12.7 20.6 18.5 12.1 12.1 
  Using USA data  
1977 
 
8.2  9.1 13.0 13.1 11.8 11.8 
1984 
 
15.1 16.5 15.9 16.5 12.7 12.7 
1994 
 
19.1 18.7 17.6 17.4 13.4 13.4 
2000 
 
16.9 16.0 15.5 15.1 10.7 10.7 
Notes: j = own country; k = other country.  Decomposition based on equation (6) in text. 
Counterfactuals are based on cumulative effect of other country components. 
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 Table 6. Accounting for Polarisation through Changing Employment Patterns 
 Observed Predicted  
(unconditional) 
Prediction  
(conditional on characteristics) 
 
 
 
I 
 
 
II 
Sex 
 
 
III 
Region  
 
 
IV 
Age, 
education 
 
V 
Region, 
sex, age, 
education. 
VI 
Britain       
1977 8.3  8.5 7.0 8.5 8.6 7.1 
1990 14.3  9.3 8.9 9.4 10.1 10.0 
2000 16.9 10.8 10.7 11.0 11.4 11.6 
77-2000 8.6 2.3 3.7 2.5 2.8 4.5 
Spain       
1977 7.0 13.9 9.0 14.0 14.9 9.0 
1990 13.5 17.4 14.7 17.6 18.2 14.6 
2000 12.3 14.4 12.9 14.5 14.8 13.1 
77-2000 5.3 0.5 3.9 0.5 0.1 4.1 
U.S.A.       
1977 11.7 12.8 12.1 12.8 13.1 12.3 
1990 12.0 10.9 10.9 11.0 11.0 11.0 
2000 10.7  9.7 9.8 9.7 9.9 9.9 
77-2000 -1.0 -3.1 -2.3 -3.1 -3.2 -2.4 
Germany       
1984 14.5 15.5 14.6 15.6 16.3 15.3 
1990 12.6 14.5 13.8 14.4 15.3 14.2 
2000 16.3 15.9 15.9 15.9 17.1 17.2 
84-2000 1.8 0.2 1.3 0.3 0.8 1.9 
Australia 
      
1982 12.7 11.5 10.0 11.5 12.1 10.4 
1990 13.7 9.9 9.4 9.9 10.6 10.1 
2000/01 15.6 10.9 10.6 11.0 11.6 11.4 
82-2000 2.9 -0.6 0.6 -0.5 -0.5 1.0 
Note: values in columns 1&2 may differ from numbers reported in Table 3 because of missing regional, gender, 
age or qualifications data. 
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Table 7. Change in Absolute Polarisation Count Within Household Type  
 All 1 Adult 2 Adult 3 Adult 
Britain 1977-2000     
Unconditional 5.5 3.3 1.9 0.3 
Conditional  3.1 2.2 0.7 0.2 
Spain 1977-2000     
Unconditional 4.5 -0.5 3.7 1.3 
Conditional  3.2 2.4 0.7 0.2 
U.S.A. 1977-2000     
Unconditional 2.1 -0.1 1.8 0.3 
Conditional  0.7 -0.1 0.7 0.1 
Germany 1984-2000     
Unconditional  1.8 -0.2 1.6 0.3 
Conditional   0.4 -0.2 0.5 0.1 
Austrl. 1982-2000     
Unconditional  3.6 4.6 3.1 - 0.4 
Conditional 2.0 4.5 1.1 - 1.0 
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Table 8. Workless Household Rate and Polarisation by Presence of Children and No. of Adults 
 1 Adult 2 Adult   3 Adult + 
 child no child child no child child No child 
Britain 
      
Household share – 1984 
 4.4 18.1 34.6 25.3 7.0 10.8 
                            – 2000  9.6 27.3 27.2 26.5 2.4  7.1 
Workless Household Rate       
1984 58.6 35.4 10.4  9.8 4.7  3.2 
2000 49.7  30.6  6.1  9.3 4.4  2.7 
Polarisation Rate 
–  (unadjusted) 
      
1984 29.5   6.3    1.9   1.3  2.2   0.7   
2000 27.0   7.9    1.0  4.2 3.3  1.6 
– (conditional) 
      
1984 19.8  5.1  4.9  0.8 2.3  0.4 
2000 21.4  6.8  2.3  2.7 3.0  1.2 
U.S.    
Household share – 1984 
 7.9 19.7 34.2 25.2 6.5  6.5 
                            – 2000  8.1 22.6 32.1 26.9 5.0  5.3 
Workless Household Rate 
      
1984 37.1 23.6  7.1 11.5 5.5  2.8  
2000 22.7  21.7  3.7  8.8 3.3  3.6 
Polarisation Rate 
–  unadjusted       
1984 
 9.0 -4.5 -0.9  3.5 3.3  0.6 
2000 
 0.7 -0.3 -1.2  3.9 2.3  2.6 
– conditional 
      
1984 
 2.3 -4.6  1.5  2.7 2.6  2.8 
2000 -3.9 -0.1  0.1  3.0 1.5  2.2 
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Table 8 (continued). Workless Household Rate and Polarisation by Presence of Children and 
No. of Adults 
 1 Adult 2 Adult   3 Adult + 
 child no child child no child child no child 
Spain 
      
Household share – 1984 
 1.4  7.1 40.2 17.8 16.2 17.4 
                            – 2000  3.6 11.9 33.5  24.5  6.7 19.8 
Workless Household Rate 
      
1984 46.2 45.6 10.4 23.3 10.3 10.7 
2000 23.9  35.2  5.0 16.8  4.6  5.1 
Polarisation Level  
- unadjusted       
1984 -2.8 -3.4 -13.6 -0.7 -1.5 -1.1 
2000 -12.1 -0.9 -8.0  3.8 -0.1  0.1 
- conditional 
      
1984 -14.2 -7.8  -3.4  0.1  0.2 -0.6 
2000 - 9.5 -2.6 -1.7  1.5 -0.1 -0.1 
Germany 
   
Population share – 1984 
 3.3 27.6 27.2 26.6 5.6  9.7 
                            – 2000  6.6 38.8 21.7 25.1 2.6  5.8 
Workless Household Rate 
      
1984 41.9 28.7  4.2 14.5 0.9  1.2  
2000 32.6  24.2  3.1 15.9 5.8  1.7 
Polarisation Level  
- unadjusted       
1984 
 9.0 -4.5 -0.9  3.5 3.3  0.6 
2000 10.5 -2.7 -5.6  4.7 -2.1 -1.9 
 – conditional 
      
1984 
 2.5 -4.1  0.1  1.6 -0.5 -1.3 
2000 
 7.1 -3.4 -1.4  1.2 3.3 -1.9 
Australia       
Household share – 1982 3.7 15.7 39.5 23.0 8.6 9.7 
                            – 2000/01 8.7 22.8 31.0 26.1 3.9 7.4 
Workless Household Rate 
      
1982 58.4 30.0 6.5 11.7 5.1 2.5 
2000/01 49.6 30.1 6.5 11.9 1.4 3.3 
Polarisation Level 
–  (unadjusted)       
1982 28.9 0.5 -2.2 3.0 3.2 0.5 
2000/01 24.7 5.3 0.3 5.7 0.2 2.1 
– (conditional) 
      
1982 15.8 1.1 1.6 2.2 3.8 0.8 
2000/01 20.4 4.1 1.9 4.1 0.2 1.7 
Note: Information on children not available in British LFS before 1983. 
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Table 9.  Composition of Workless Households (Share of households in each category) 
 1 Adult 2 Adult 3+ Adult Total 
Unemployed     
1984     
Australia (82) 0.15 0.45 0.85 0.31 
G.B. 0.26 0.66 0.89 0.44 
U.S. 0.21 0.37 0.73 0.29 
Spain 0.14 0.55 0.87 0.52 
Germany 0.24 0.35 0.75 0.30 
2000     
Australia 0.23 0.36 0.32 0.27 
G.B. 0.19 0.28 0.58 0.22 
U.S. 0.16 0.21 0.50 0.19 
Spain 0.23 0.38 0.81 0.36 
Germany 0.30 0.40 0.67 0.35 
Lone Parent     
1984     
Australia (82) 0.28   0.15 
G.B. 0.24   0.13 
U.S. 0.27   0.18 
Spain 0.15   0.04 
Germany 0.19   0.11 
2000     
Australia 0.27   0.18 
G.B. 0.31   0.23 
U.S. 0.20   0.15 
Spain 0.11   0.04 
Germany 0.18   0.11 
Inactive Age 55+    
1984     
Australia (82) 0.42 0.32 0.09 0.36 
G.B. 0.39 0.13 0.08 0.28 
U.S. 0.32 0.28 0.21 0.29 
Spain 0.56 0.25 0.01 0.27 
Germany 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.43 
2000     
Australia 0.28 0.37 0.48 0.32 
G.B. 0.28 0.24 0.01 0.27 
U.S. 0.35 0.32 0.04 0.33 
Spain 0.48 0.38 0.01 0.38 
Germany 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.38 
Other     
1984     
Australia (82) 0.15 0.23 0.07 0.18 
G.B. 0.11 0.21 0.10 0.15 
U.S. 0.19 0.34 0.27 0.25 
Spain 0.15 0.19 0.12 0.17 
Germany 0.16 0.17 0.25 0.16 
2000     
Australia 0.22 0.27 0.20 0.23 
G.B. 0.22 0.48 0.42 0.29 
U.S. 0.29 0.47 0.46 0.34  
Spain 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.21 
Germany 0.16 0.12 0.33 0.15 
Notes: GSOEP data for Germany refer to “officially unemployed” (self-assessed). Numbers are proportion of 
households with at least 1 (self-assessed) unemployed occupant, lone parent not unemployed, all occupants aged 
55 and over excluding previous 2 categories. Other category is the residual. 
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Figure A1. Alternative Polarisation Indices  
 
Polarisation Indices
year
 Absolute polarisation  Normalised polarisation
 Relative polarisation
Great Britain Spain U.S.A.
75 80 85 90 95 2000
Germany
75 80 85 90 95 2000
Australia
75 80 85 90 95 2000
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Table A1. Decomposition of polarisation in workless household rate 1977-2000 over the cycle 
 ∆ polarisation 
(I) 
Within Household 
types 
(II) 
Between Household  
(III) 
Britain    
77-2000  6.3  5.5 0.8 
Spain    
77-2000  4.4 
 4.6 -0.2 
United States    
77-2000  2.1 
 2.2 -0.1 
Germany    
84-2000  1.2 
 1.5 -0.1 
Australia    
82-00/01 3.6 2.9 0.6 
 
Table A2. Relative Polarisation by Household Type 
 1 Adult  2 Adult    3 Adult  
Britain 1977 2000 1977 2000 1977 2000 
Raw 1.06 (0.03) 1.58 (0.02) 0.84 (0.01) 1.47 (0.02) 0.87 (0.03) 2.83 (0.07) 
Conditional   1.05 1.43 1.40 1.49  1.42 2.16 
Spain       
Raw 0.95 (0.02) 0.90 (0.02) 0.38 (0.01) 0.77 (0.01) 0.37 (0.01) 1.07 (0.02) 
Conditional  0.73 0.89 0.77 0.97 0.72 0.94 
United States       
Raw 1.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.02) 0.78 (0.01) 1.23 (0.02) 1.08 (0.04) 3.25 (0.10) 
Conditional  0.88 0.95  1.06 1.31 1.24   2.16 
Germany 1984 2000 1984 2000 1984 2000 
Raw 0.96 (0.05) 0.93 (0.04) 0.95 (0.04) 1.35 (0.04) 0.36 (0.03) 1.49 (0.08) 
Conditional  0.90 0.93 1.10 1.00 0.53 0.90 
Australia 1982 2000/01 1982 2000/01 1982 2000/01 
Raw 1.19 1.42 0.96 1.46 1.92 2.10 
Conditional 1.12 1.31 1.27 1.48 2.39 1.83 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. 
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Table A3. Welfare Systems and Wage Inequality across countries in 2000 
Country Germany Spain UK US Australia 
Wage 
Inequality 50/10 
1995 
 
 1.44 
 
1.66 
 
1.81 
 
1.95 1.65 
Unemployment 
Insurance – 
Duration 
 
Varies with age 
and 
contributions.  
For those aged 
< 42 the max. is 
312 days (not 
Sundays). Rises 
to 832 days for 
over 54s. 
24 months on 
fraction of 
previous wage 
and up to 30 
months in total 
 26 weeks (52 
weeks prior to 
1996) 
26 weeks but 
can be extended 
to 39 weeks in 
some states. 
No UI system 
Unemployment  
Insurance – 
Ratio of 
Earnings 
60% of previous 
net earnings for 
childless and 
67% for those 
with children up 
to a ceiling.  
70% of previous 
gross wage for 
6 months 
60% up to 24 
months  
Then multiple 
of minimum 
wage based on 
family size 
Not earnings 
related but flat 
rate for singles 
or couples if 
with a non-
working 
partner. Child 
support comes 
under social 
assistance 
below. 
50% of 
reference gross 
salary up to a 
maximum 
value..  
Not applicable. 
Unemployment 
Insurance - 
Eligibility 
360 days of 
work in last 3 
years 
12 months 
contributions in 
last 6 years. 
More 
contributions 
means benefits 
last longer. 
25 weeks in one 
of previous two 
tax years. 
6 months 
employment 
above a 
minimum 
earnings level. 
Not applicable 
Unemployment 
Assistance 
 
Eligibility is as 
for UI but rates 
are for 53% of 
previous net 
earnings and 
57% with 
children. 
Benefit is 
indefinite.  
Families with 
Children  for 30 
months and 
those aged 45+ 
1 year after UI 
exhausted  for 6 
months. Value 
is 75% of 
minimum wage 
See SA below None Eligible to all 
actively seeking 
work and able 
to begin full-
time work. Not 
related to 
previous 
earnings but  
subject to 
means testing. 
Benefit is 
indefinite. 
Social 
Assistance -  
 Regional based 
minimum 
income based 
on family size. 
Lone parents 
receive extra 
help. No job 
search required. 
Regional based 
minimum 
income based 
on family size. 
Value is low. 
Job search 
required. 
 
Minimum 
income for the 
unemployed 
and lone parents 
(who are not 
required to find 
work). Benefits 
indefinite. 
Value based on 
family size and 
renters can get 
extra Housing 
Benefit.  
Food stamps are 
available to any 
family unit with 
job seekers.  
Lone parent 
families or 
those with a 
disabled 
member could 
claim AFDC. 
Some state 
variation. 
Replaced from 
1997 by TANF.  
Assistance 
available to lone 
parents and  
other groups not 
actively seeking 
work such as 
those with a 
disability, and 
carers. 
Additional 
assistance 
available to 
renters and 
families with 
children. 
OECD Standard 
Replacement 
Ratio for 
married couple 
with two kids 
against wage of 
2/3 average 
production 
wage 
 73% on UA 
scheme 
including 
housing 
support. 
67% on 60% of 
previous wage 
UI scheme 
 76% on SA 
over 52 weeks 
including 
renters housing 
support 
51% on SA if 
eligible. 
86% 
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